State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from August 16, 2001 by New York State Public Employment Relations Board
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Board Decisions - NYS PERB New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) 
8-16-2001 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions 
from August 16, 2001 
New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the New York State Public Employment Relations Board 
(PERB) at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Board Decisions - NYS PERB by an 
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-
dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
State of New York Public Employment Relations Board Decisions from August 16, 
2001 
Keywords 
NY, NYS, New York State, PERB, Public Employment Relations Board, board decisions, labor disputes, 
labor relations 
Comments 
This document is part of a digital collection provided by the Martin P. Catherwood Library, ILR School, 
Cornell University. The information provided is for noncommercial educational use only. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/perbdecisions/427 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
YONKERS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 860, AFT, AFL-CIO, CASE NO. D-0266 
Respondent, 
upon the Charge of Violation of §210.1 of 
the Civil Service Law 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the application of the Yonkers Federation of 
Teachers, Local 860, AFT, AFL-CIO (Federation), for restoration of the dues and 
agency shop fee deduction privileges afforded under §208 of the Civil Service Law 
(CSL). The Federation's privileges were suspended by an order of this Board dated 
December 20, 1999.1 At that time, we determined that the Federation had violated CSL 
§210.1 by engaging in a strike against the Yonkers City School District (District) for four 
workdays from October 1, 1999 to October 6, 1999. As a consequence of this strike, 
we ordered that the Federation's dues and agency shop fee deduction privileges be 
suspended indefinitely, provided, however, the Federation could apply to this Board for 
restoration of said privileges at any time after the expiration of eighteen (18) months 
from the commencement of the suspension. 
!32PERB H3075(1999). 
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The application to this Board was to be on notice to all interested parties, 
supported by proof of good faith compliance with CSL §210.1 since the violation, and 
accompanied by an affirmation that the Federation no longer asserts the right to strike, 
as required by CSL §210.3(g). 
The Federation has submitted an affirmation that it does not assert the right to 
strike and we have ascertained, through the letter of support from the District and other 
documents found in its petition, the Federation's good faith compliance with the statute 
and our order. The documentary evidence demonstrates that the Federation 
successfully negotiated a successor agreement, among other things, and, therefore, 
has not engaged in, caused, instigated, encouraged, condoned or threatened a strike 
against the District since the above-stated violation 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the indefinite suspension of the dues and 
agency shop fee deduction privileges of the Yonkers Federation of Teachers, Local 
860, AFT, AFL-CIO be, and hereby is, terminated, effective immediately. 
DATED: August 16, 2001 
Albany, New York 
"TBe—V 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
// 
// // //!« //I 
ohn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HOPE SOBIE, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASENO.U-21606 
NEW ROCHELLE FEDERATION OF SCHOOL 
EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 280, AFT/NYSUT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
-and-
THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
NEW ROCHELLE, 
Employer. 
MERRIL SOBIE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JAMES R. SANDNER (CHRISTOPHER M. CALLAGY of counsel), for 
Respondent 
McGUIRE, KEHL & NEALON, LLP (JEFFREY A. KEHL of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Hope Sobie to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), dismissing her improper practice charge which, as 
amended, alleged that the New Rochelle Federation of United School Employees, 
Local 280, AFT/NYSUT, AFL-CIO (Federation) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
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Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it refused to represent her or assist her in 
a grievance alleging that her employer, the City School District of the City of New 
Rochelle (District), had failed to pay her a longevity increment included in the recently 
negotiated collective bargaining agreement between the Federation and the District.1 
At the hearing, the ALJ closed the record at the end of Sobie's case to afford the 
parties the opportunity to brief the issue of timeliness of the improper practice charge 
and the sufficiency of Sobie's proof. The ALJ thereafter dismissed the charge on her 
own motion, finding that the untimeliness of the charge was first revealed at the 
hearing.2 She did not decide whether Sobie's direct case was otherwise sufficient. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Sobie excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the relevant dates were 
apparent from the pleadings and that neither the Federation nor the District raised 
timeliness as an affirmative defense in their answers. Sobie further argues that the 
charge is, in fact, timely. The Federation and the District support the ALJ's decision and 
argue, in addition, that Sobie's charge fails for lack of proof. 
FACTS 
The facts of the case are recited in detail in the ALJ's decision and will be 
repeated here only as required by this decision. 
1The District is made a statutory party to the case pursuant to §209-a.3 of the 
Act. 
2Section 212.4(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) provides that an ALJ 
) may dismiss a charge on his or her own motion if the failure of timeliness is first 
revealed at the hearing. 
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Sobie is a school psychologist employed by the District and her title is in the unit 
represented by the Federation. Sobie believes that she is entitled to a longevity 
increment provided for in the parties' 1998-2001 collective bargaining agreement. The 
increment is payable to unit employees "on the 22nd anniversary of actual teaching 
service in the District". Sobie did not receive the increment in September 1999 and, 
when she contacted the District, she was informed that she was not eligible for the 
increment because she did not have sufficient years of service.3 In the amended 
charge, Sobie alleges that she contacted the Federation in October and November 
1999 to request their assistance and the Federation refused.4 Sobie further alleges that 
she subsequently asked the Federation to meet with her and the District to informally 
resolve the issue and the Federation refused. She also alleges that, in December 1999, 
she requested that the Federation file a grievance and the Federation refused. Finally, 
Sobie alleges that she requested the Federation to take her grievance to arbitration on 
December 21, 1999, and that the Federation refused her request on January 13, 2000. 
In her testimony at the hearing, Sobie stated that she had conversations with 
Gerry O'Brien, the Federation president, and Ted Ackerman, one of the members of the 
Federation's negotiating team, in October and November 1999. During those 
3Sobie was employed by the District from 1967 to 1970. She resigned in 1970 
and was subsequently rehired in 1976 as a part-time employee. She became a full-time 
District employee in 1986. 
4ln an offer of proof at the outset of the hearing, the Federation stated that Sobie 
had not requested that the Federation file a grievance on her behalf in October or 
November 1999 and that the first time that Sobie sought the involvement of the 
Federation was her January 2000 request that the Federation take her grievance to 
arbitration. 
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conversations, she requested the Federation's support of her grievance. She was 
refused because the Federation, relying on the collective bargaining agreement's 
provisions regarding seniority for its computation of Sobie's longevity, had determined 
that she did not have twenty-two year's of service with the District. 
Sobie and her counsel subsequently met with the District and, when her 
concerns were not resolved, filed a grievance on December 9, 1999. The District denied 
the grievance on December 17, 1999, noting that Sobie did not have sufficient years of 
service to be entitled to the increment. Sobie, by letter dated December 20, 1999, 
requested that the Federation appeal the denial to arbitration. Sobie and her counsel 
met with the Federation's grievance committee on January 11, 2000, and reiterated the 
basis for her belief that she was entitled to the increment. By letter dated January 13, 
2000, the Federation informed Sobie that it would not pursue her grievance because, 
based upon the collective bargaining agreement and its negotiating history, the 
Federation concluded that Sobie had only 19.6 years of service as of June 30, 1999, 
and was, therefore, not entitled to the increment. 
DISCUSSION 
Neither the Federation nor the District raised timeliness as an affirmative 
defense in their answers to the improper practice charge. Therefore, the charge may be 
dismissed as untimeiy oniy if the failure of timeiiness was first reveaied at the hearing.5 
The amended charge alleges that Sobie first asked the Federation to file a grievance 
for her in December 1999. The charge, filed on April 6, 2000, appeared on its face to be 
5Rules, §212.4 (I). See also CityofBinghamton, 31 PERB 1J3088 (1998); Nassau 
Comm. Coll., 20 PERB fl 3010 (1987); PEF, 15 PERB 1J3066 (1982). 
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timely filed. However, at the hearing, Sobie did testify that she requested the 
Federation's assistance in November 1999 in filing a grievance and that her request 
was refused. At the close of the charging party's case, the ALJ, upon her own motion, 
closed the record and directed the parties to brief the issue of timeliness. Following 
receipt of the transcript, the ALJ further directed the parties to brief the issue of whether 
Sobie's direct case was sufficient under the standards enunciated in County of Nassau 
(Police Department) (Unterweiser)(hereafter, Unterweiser).6 She thereafter dismissed 
the charge as untimely as it was filed more than four months after the untimeliness of 
the charge first became apparent at the hearing.7 We do not agree. 
In October and November 1999, the Federation discussed with Sobie its reasons 
for believing that she was not entitled to the increment, explaining the contract 
provisions it relied upon and the negotiating history of those provisions, and the 
mathematical computation of Sobie's years of service using those provisions. Sobie 
responded by filing the grievance on her own. Sobie thereafter requested that the 
Federation take her grievance to arbitration. The Federation grievance committee met 
with Sobie and her representative. Sobie's request was denied by the Federation's 
January 13, 2000 letter, in which the Federation outlined the reasons for its refusal. 
The amended charge, complaining of the Federation's refusal to take Sobie's 
grievance to arbitration, is timely on its face and neither the Federation nor the District 
raised timeliness in their answers to the charge. Indeed, in its offer of proof to the ALJ 
617PERB H3013(1984). 
7A charge must be filed within four months of the action which forms the basis of 
the charge. Rules, §204.1(a)(1). 
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at the opening of the hearing, the Federation stated that there had been no request 
from Sobie prior to the January 2000 demand for arbitration for it to process a 
grievance on her behalf. Given the pleadings, the Federation's offer and Sobie's 
somewhat confused testimony as to what she actually discussed with O'Brien and 
Ackerman, we find that there is insufficient conflict^ ^ between the facts alleged in the 
amended charge and those adduced at the hearing on the issue of timeliness to 
support a motion pursuant to §212.4(1) of the Rules. 
Because of her decision on the timeliness issue, the ALJ did not reach the 
second issue presented by Sobie's direct case - the sufficiency of the proof in light of 
the standards enunciated in Unterweiser. We find it appropriate, therefore, to remand 
this matter to the ALJ for a decision on that issue. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant Sobie's exceptions and reverse the 
decision of the ALJ. The matter is, therefore, remanded to the ALJ for further 
processing consistent with this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 16, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
_ /AA fyf /^y 
/ // //"V ^ ^ l ' ovists v 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN ZITO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-21928 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
LOCAL 2, AFT, NYSUT, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent, 
- and -
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer. 
JOHN ZITO, pro se 
CHARLES D. MAURER, ESQ., for Respondent 
DALE C. KUTZBACH, GENERAL COUNSEL (JERRY N. ROTHMAN and 
SUSAN MANDEL of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by John Zito (Zito) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge against the United Federation of Teachers, 
Local 2, AFT, NYSUT, AFL-CIO (UFT). The charge alleges that UFT violated §209-
a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by not processing a 
grievance that Zito filed against the Board of Education of the City School District of the 
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City of New York (Board of Education). The Board of Education is made a party to this 
proceeding pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act.1 
EXCEPTIONS 
In his exceptions, Zito argues, in substance, that the ALJ erred in applying the 
facts to the law. UFT supports the position of the ALJ. The Board of Education has not 
filed a response. 
FACTS 
A full exposition of the facts is set forth in the ALJ's decision.2 For the purpose of 
our decision, we will confine our review to the salient facts relevant to the exceptions 
filed by Zito. 
Zito was a tenured math teacher employed by the Board of Education since 
1985. As the result of two separate incidents at Lafayette High School in March 1999, 
he sustained personal injuries for which he was granted a line-of-duty-injury leave from 
April 1999 to April 2000. He utilized his sick leave, borrowed sick days, and also 
received a grace period for the line of duty leave of absence. 
However, in June 1999, Zito suffered a heart attack which resulted in 
hospitalization. In either August or September 1999, he applied for a leave of absence 
Section 209-a.3 of the Act provides: 
The public employer shall be made a party to any charge 
filed under [§209-a.2] which alleges that the duly recognized 
or certified employee organization breached its duty of fair 
representation in the processing of or failure to process a 
claim that the public employer has breached its agreement 
with such employee organization. 
2See 34 PERB 1J4553 (2001). 
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to restore his health. This leave was granted without pay and it ran from September 
1999 to June 2000. 
During Zito's leave of absence, he received, on November 3, 1999, a letter from 
Chancellor Rudolph Crew advising him that he was being suspended with pay from his 
teaching duties pending a hearing in accordance with Education Law §3020-a.3 The 
specifications allege that Zito had excessive absences during the period September 
1998 to April 1999 and, as a result, neglected his teaching duties. 
In April 2000, Zito filed a Step 2 grievance seeking "to drop the suspension with 
pay and the 3020-a".4 Zito testified that the reason for the delay was that because ". . . 
[he] had not gotten any help from the union, [he] decided to take it upon [himself] to do 
something."5 Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, teachers have 
the right to process grievances at Steps 1 and 2. "Contractually, the [UFT] reserved the 
right to approve grievances to proceed to Step 3 or arbitration to Step 4."6 
Zito's suspension had been under investigation by the UFT. On or about 
January 14, 1999, UFT representative Helen Doughty sent a memo regarding Zito's 
grievance to Howard J. Bloch, UFT Grievance Chair, recommending that UFT not 
3The record demonstrated that Zito had not been paid by the Board of Education 
while on restoration of health leave. 
4See charging party exhibit 3. 
5Transcript p. 35. 
6See Transcript pp. 50-51 (Fresko testimony). 
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proceed to Step 3.7 Subsequently, on May 9, 2000, Howard Schoor, Chairman, UFT 
Grievance Committee, advised Zito that UFT would not take his case to Step 3 of the 
grievance procedure and that, if Zito wished to appeal this decision, to contact Helen 
Doughty.8 On or about October 4, 2000, Zito received a letter from George Fesko, 
Assistant to the UFT President, advising Zito that the internal appeal committee of UFT, 
Grievance Committee of the Ad Com, had denied his appeal and gave its reasons for 
the denial. 
Fesko testified that there was no contractual provision that covered Zito's 
complaint, i.e. "that he got a letter saying he was suspended with pay while he was on . 
. . unpaid restoration to health leave."9 Zito sought to convert unpaid status to paid 
status. However, at the time he received the suspension letter and subsequent thereto, 
he could not perform any duties.10 
Even though UFT decided not to pursue Zito's grievance to Step 3, it pointed out 
to him the remedy of medical arbitration. As Fesko testified, "we said that we would 
look into whether or not we could expedite i t . . . because if he won his medical 
arbitration, he would have a paid status . . . ."11 However, Fesko testified that Zito 
postponed the medical arbitration hearing. Zito was advised by letter that the Medical 
7See Respondent's Exhibit 2 ^Note: the date is a typographical error and should 
read January 14, 2000). 
8See Charging Party Exhibit 4. 
9See Transcript p. 55 (Fesko's testimony). 
10See Transcript pp. 30-33 (Zito's cross-examination). 
nSee Transcript pp. 54-55 (Fesko's testimony). 
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Bureau wanted him to reschedule and a third letter had been sent to Zito to reschedule 
or consider the arbitration abandoned.12 
DISCUSSION 
Zito argues in his exceptions that the ALJ was deceived into believing the legal 
advice UFT received was unbiased. He...supports this argument with documents which 
were not introduced by him at the hearing and may not be considered by us through his 
exceptions.13 
The record fails to demonstrate that UFT violated the standard for a duty of fair 
representation charge found in Civil Service Employees Association v. PERB and 
Diaz.u Zito has failed to demonstrate that UFT's conduct, or lack thereof, was 
deliberately invidious, arbitrary or done in bad faith. 
The record is clear that UFT investigated Zito's grievance over his suspension 
and found it to be without merit. He did not like UFT's decision. A union is not required 
to agree with a unit employee's interpretation of the contract .15 We have consistently 
held that we would not substitute our judgment for that of a union's regarding the filing 
and prosecution of grievances, for a union is given a wide range of reasonableness in 
12See Transcript p. 56 (Fesko's testimony). 
12Margolin v. Newman, 130 AD2d 312, 20 PERB fi7018 (3d Dep't 1987), appeal 
dismissed, 71 NY2d 844, 21 PERB 1J7005 (1988). 
14132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dep't 1987), affirmed on other grounds, 73 
NY2d 796, 21 PERB ^7017 (1988). 
15See Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 580 and Central New York Regional 
Transp. Auth., 32 PERB 1J3053 (1999). 
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these regards.16 Fesko testified that UFT gave the reasons for its decision not to 
pursue his grievance to arbitration and, in fact, offered him alternatives to arbitration 
which he did not pursue. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny Zito's exceptions and we affirm the decision 
oftheALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 16, 2001 
Albany, New York 
^wl^A1 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
jrc A: Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
See District Council 37, AFSCME (Gonzalez), 28 PERB P062 (1995). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MICHAEL W.CIOCE, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22298 
WESTCHESTER COUNTY CORRECTION 
OFFICERS BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Respondent, 
-and-
COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, 
Intervenor. 
MICHAEL W. CIOCE, pro se 
GOODSTEIN & WEST (ROBERT DAVID GOODSTEIN of counsel), for 
Respondent 
CHARLENE INDELICATO, COUNTY ATTORNEY (LORI ALESIO of counsel), 
for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Michael W. Cioce to a decision of 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing 
his improper practice charge which, as amended, alleged that the Westchester County 
Correction Officers Benevolent Association, Inc. (COBA) violated §209-a.2(c) of the 
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Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to consider the merits of his 
grievance.1 The Director found that COBA had tabled discussion of whether the 
grievance would proceed to arbitration until its next meeting in order to give Cioce an 
opportunity to speak because he had failed to appear at the February 23, 2001, 
grievance committee meeting. Finding that such action was neither arbitrary, 
discriminatory nor taken in bad faith, the Director dismissed the charge. 
EXCEPTIONS 
Cioce alleges in his exceptions that the Director erred in dismissing his improper 
practice charge because he did not consider other grievances that Cioce had previously 
filed and because he did not consider COBA's further actions with respect to the at-
issue grievance after the filing of the improper practice charge. Neither COBA nor the 
County have responded. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the arguments 
made, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
FACTS 
Cioce is a corrections officer employed by the County. He filed a grievance with 
COBA on November 13, 2000, alleging that the County violated the COBA-County 
collective bargaining agreement in the handling of his Workers' Compensation and 
1The County of Westchester (County) is a statutory party pursuant to § 209-a.3 
of the Act. 
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General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c claims arising out of alleged on-the-job injuries 
going back to 1994. 
COBA alleged in its answer that the grievance had been denied at Step 1 of the 
parties' contractual grievance procedure and that it was scheduled for February 23, 
""2001";foT"diBCU"ssion'"'by"COBA,s"""grieva"n"ce""committe"e~an"d""a""de"cision""as"to""wh"eth"eT 
COBA would take the grievance to arbitration. COBA alleged that Cioce had been 
invited to attend the meeting to discuss the grievance and that he neither responded to 
the invitation nor appeared at COBA's February 23 meeting. COBA, therefore, tabled 
discussion of the grievance until such time as another meeting could be scheduled for 
Cioce to attend. Cioce filed the instant charge alleging that COBA had taken no action 
on the November 13, 2000, grievance and had taken no action on a number of 
grievances he had filed since 1996.2 
Thereafter, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) scheduled a pre-hearing 
conference at which both Cioce and representatives of COBA appeared.3 Summarizing 
the discussions at the conference in a March 15, 2001, letter, the assigned ALJ 
informed the parties that unless his characterization of the facts was disputed, the case 
would be assigned to another ALJ for decision and would likely be dismissed. He set 
2See Westchester County Correction Officers Benev. Ass'n, 33 PERB 1J4638 
(2000), where Cioce's charge that COBA had not timely responded to his November 13, 
2000, grievance, filed seven days after Cioce had filed the grievance, was dismissed 
because that time frame was not, perse, unreasonable. Cioce's allegations that COBA 
had not properly processed previous grievances were also dismissed. 
3The County did not appear. 
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forth the facts as stated above and noted that COBA had, in fact, taken an action on 
Cioce's November 13, 2000, grievance by taking it to Step I and by scheduling it for 
discussion at its February 23 grievance committee meeting. Cioce's response, which 
was filed as an unnumbered improper practice charge, argued that there is nothing in 
the collective bargaining agreement or "arbitration law" which requires a grievant to 
meet with his employee organization before a decision can be made to arbitrate a 
pending grievance. Cioce also referred to his alleged on-the-job injuries and his prior 
grievances as evidencing COBA's unwillingness to process any grievances he filed. 
In his March 30, 2001 letter, the ALJ confirmed that Cioce did not dispute the 
characterization of the facts but only disputed that his participation at the grievance 
\ review meeting was necessary and proper. The matter was thereafter submitted to the 
Director for decision on the stipulated record. COBA filed a brief in which it alleged that 
it had scheduled Cioce's November 13, 2000, grievance for discussion at its May 1, 
2001, grievance committee meeting and that Cioce had indicated that he would not 
attend. Neither Cioce nor the County filed briefs with the Director. 
DISCUSSION 
Cioce attempts in his pleadings submitted to the ALJ and in his exceptions to this 
Board to argue the merits of his GML §207-c and Workers' Compensation claims, as 
well as the merits of all his prior grievances. He has filed, both with the ALJ and the 
Board, extensive submissions which have previously been filed with the County and 
COBA detailing his case, which began with an alleged on-the-job injury in 1994. His 
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reference to these past actions provides an historical perspective to his current 
improper practice charge, but cannot form the basis for separate improper practices.4 
His charge, as pled and as litigated, alleges only that it was a breach of the duty 
of fair representation for COBA to table discussion on his grievance until he was 
present tojoin in the discussion. Thererare no factspled by Cioce which; if proven, 
would support a finding that COBA's action was arbitrary, discriminatory or taken in bad 
faith5. Indeed, COBA's action in inviting Cioce to discuss and explain his grievance 
before COBA's grievance committee made a decision about arbitration could be said to 
be the antithesis of such conduct. 
His allegations in the exceptions relating to events which occurred after the 
charge was filed are not properly before us. COBA's further actions were taken after the 
Director issued his decision and may not, therefore, be considered.6 
Based on the foregoing, we deny Cioce's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the Director. 
4See Guilderland Teachers Aide Ass'n, 32 PERB fl3023 (1999). 
5
 See CSEA v. PERB and Diaz, 132 AD2d 430, 20 PERB 1J7024 (3d Dep't 1987), 
affirmed on other grounds, 73 NY2d 796, 21 PERB 1J7017 (1988). 
6See Law Enforcement Officers Union Council 82, AFSCME (Gardner), 31 PERB 
1J3076 (1998) and cases cited therein. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: August 16, 2001 
Albany, New York —* 
Midjael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ Jcjhn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SARA-ANN P. FEARON, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22492 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK and 
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, 
Respondents. 
SHELLMAN JOHNSON & ASSOCIATES FOR EQUAL EDUCATION 
(SHELLMAN JOHNSON, Chief Advocate), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions of Sara-Ann P. Fearon to the decision of 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) which 
dismissed her improper practice charge alleging that the Board of Education of the City 
School District of the City of New York (District) and the United Federation of Teachers 
(UFT) violated, respectively, §209-a.1(a) and §209-a.2.(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). 
FACTS 
Fearon filed her improper practice charge on April 4, 2001, alleging, inter alia, 
that: 
The United Federation of Teachers by letters dated January 24, 
February 5 and February 27, 2001, arbitrarily refused to reconsider 
its erroneous position to not process my incomplete Step 3 process 
expeditiously to arbitration. The Chancellor abused his discretion 
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as per Articles 22B4g and 22c. This case is ripe for PERB review; I 
believe there is an ongoing conspiracy between the UFT and Board 
of Education to not resolve the outstanding Step 3 grievance 
issues, even though grieved year after year as per the enclosed 
September 14, 2000 letters. See enclosed affidavit of 
particularization of the charge of improper practice. 
The first letter dated September 14, 2000, from Howard Schoor, UFT Grievance 
Committee Chairman, refers to the subject grievance case No. A-017-K16295 (Faculty 
Conferences). In that letter, Schoor informs Fearon that "this office is persuaded that 
your case has merit and we wish to pursue the appeal to the third step." The second 
letter dated September 14, 2000, from Fearon to Chancellor Harold O. Levy requested 
a conference pursuant to Art. 22B1c of the UFT-District collective bargaining 
agreement. 
On April 10, 2001, the Director advised Fearon of the deficiencies of her charge 
pursuant to §204.2(a) of the PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules). Fearon was advised 
to correct the following deficiencies on or before April 24, 2001, or the charge would be 
deemed withdrawn: 
The pleading in the above-referenced matter is deficient for the reasons 
set forth below. 
It cannot be determined what act, or action, constitutes the alleged 
violations. In any event, no act committed by the employer within four 
months of the filing of the charge appears to be identified, nor are there 
any facts to establish a violation of Section 209-a.1 (a) 
As against the union, the only acts within the four-month statute of 
limitations are Mr. Bloch's letters of January 24, February 5 and February 
27. [However], [fjhere are no facts to establish that those letters are 
arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
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On April 18, 2001, Fearon filed an Amended Charge alleging, inter alia, that... 
Howard Bloch, Director United Federation of Teachers (UFT) Grievance 
Committee, engaged in bad faith and/or improper practice when he 
arbitrarily and invidiously stayed processing my Step 3 grievance to 
arbitration, in light of questions concerning the Chancellor's non-
compliance with Step 3 contractual grievance process. See designated 
paragraphs "8"-"17" of the affidavit of particulars and subsequent 
amendment dated April 13, 2001to the affidavit of particulars. Also, my 
Exhibit "B" three Bloch letters dated January 24, February 4, and February 
27 are probative to the truth of my allegations that Bloch arbitrarily stayed 
processing said grievance. See designated paragraphs "15" and "16" to 
my affidavit of particulars.1 
In amended companion subsection 209-a.1(a) the Chancellor's non-
compliance with the Step 3 decision and it being withheld from me was 
known to Howard Bloch since October 28, 2000. See Exhibit "A" 
appended hereto and designated paragraphs "2"-"9" of the original 
particulars that satisfy, in my view, the alleged conspiracy theory 
identifying complicity of the employer within the four month statute of 
limitations as charged. Prima Facie, [emphasis in original] There is no 
dispute that the Chancellor's November 11, 2000 decision raises 
questions of my employer's compliance with the Step 3 requirements. 
Exhibit A of the Amended Petition contains a letter from Sara-Ann Fearon to 
Howard Bloch. In this letter, Fearon expressed her dissatisfaction with the manner in 
which UFT handled her grievance #A-017-K16295. 
On May 2, 2001, Fearon's representative, Shellman Johnson, submitted an 
unsolicited letter to the Director purporting to explain the amended charge. This letter 
was not considered by the Director because it was submitted after the filing date of April 
24,2001. 
On May 8, 2001, the Director issued a decision in accordance with §204.2(a) of 
the Rules, dismissing the improper practice charge. 
1The letters from Howard Bloch are annexed to the original petition as Exhibit B. 
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Fearon, in conjunction with exceptions to the Director's decision, moved to 
reopen the Director's decision on July 9, 2001. This motion was predicated on new 
evidence allegedly withheld from her and thereby unavailable to cure the deficiency 
found by the Director. Fearon also moved to consolidate the pending matter with a new 
charge.2 ._ .._.... 
EXCEPTIONS 
Fearon's exceptions allege in substance that the Director's decision is biased in 
favor of the respondents and that he misapplied PERB case law. 
DISCUSSION 
Fearon argues, among other things, that the Director "appears to testify for the 
UFT and the District." She alleges that the collective bargaining agreement is clear 
that the "Chancellor shall communicate his decision in writing to the aggrieved 
employee." Consequently, she argues that her exception must be sustained as a 
matter of law. We disagree. 
Fearon filed an amended charge on April 18, 2001, rather than supplement the 
original charge in response to the Director's deficiency letter. The amended charge 
supersedes the original charge. Thus, the original charge forms no part of the record 
and the case proceeds as if the original charge had never been served.3 
A review of the amended charge aiieges that "Howard Bioch arbitrarily and 
2Fearon filed the new improper practice charge directly with the Board. It has 
been forwarded to the Director for further processing (Case No. U-22693). The Board 
does not accept charges filed at the Board level; all improper practice charges must be 
filed with the Director. (Rules, §204.1 (a)(1)). 
36 Carmody-Wait, 2d §34:8. 
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invidiously stayed processing my Step 3 grievance ...." In support of this allegation, 
Fearon relies upon a letter sent by her to Bloch on October 28, 2000. 
In that letter, Fearon outlines the errors UFT committed. Under our Rules and 
case law, it was October 2000 that commenced the time to file her charge with PERB.4 
.._Qur..Rules.do._not_provide.for.anyjextensiQn..of1im.e..to.file...an.improper_.p.ractice..charge..?.._. 
We have also determined that the filing period is not tolled while ancillary proceedings 
[grievance arbitration] are being pursued by or on behalf of a charging party, even when 
those proceedings have the potential to effectively moot the improper practice alleged.6 
Since the basis of the charge against both respondents occurred in October 2000, 
which is more than four months prior to the filing of the original charge on April 4, 2001, 
the charges against the respondents are time-barred. The Director's timeliness 
determination was correct and the charge was properly dismissed. 
As to the motion to reopen, this motion is denied because it is also predicated 
upon the same facts and circumstances of the improper practice charge, which 
occurred sometime in 1999. Fearon and her representative misapprehend the 
timeliness rule. That Fearon has obviously been engaged in a protracted labor dispute 
with both UFT and the District,7 as we previously stated, does not toll the running of our 
4Section 204.1(a)(1) of PERB's Rules of Procedure mandates that improper 
practice charges be filed within four months of the date of the conduct which is the 
subject of the charge. 
5See PEF (Mankowski), 33 PERB 1J3032 (2000). 
6See Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (Hokai), 32 PERB Tf3019 (1999). 
) 7See United Fed'n of Teachers (Fearon), 33 PERB fi3003 (2000), motion to 
reconsider denied, United Fed'n of Teachers (Fearon), 33 PERB fl3011 (2000). See 
also United Fed'n of Teachers (Fearon), 33 PERB 1J4635 (2000). 
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four-month rule. The reason behind this rule is to avoid the prosecution of stale claims. 
Our Rule, §204.2, states clearly "that [if] the alleged violation occurred more than four 
months prior to the filing of the charge, it shall be dismissed by the director...." 
Consequently, in order for us to invoke our jurisdiction over a charge which may have 
as its subject matter the failure to process a grievance or the manner in which a 
grievance has been processed, the charge must have been filed within four months of 
the alleged improper practice. The time limit is not tolled while the parties exhaust their 
grievance remedies under the collective bargaining agreement. 
As to the motion to consolidate, this motion is denied. 
Based on the foregoing, the exceptions are denied and the Director's decision is 
affirmed. The motion to reopen is denied as well as the motion to consolidate. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and hereby is, dismissed in 
its entirety. 
DATED: August 16, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Cuevas, Chairman 
w^r,1 
John T. Mitchell, Member^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, 
LOCAL 200-D/1199, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5118 
COUNTY OF ALBANY, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Service Employees International Union, 
Local 200-D/1199 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of 
the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
beiow, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
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Included: All regularly scheduled full-time and part-time Registered 
Professional Nurses and Nurse Managers (Head Nurses) 
employed by the Albany County Department of Residential Health 
Care Facilities. 
Excluded: Health Services Director, Assistant Health Service Director, Senior 
NursingjSupervisor, Assistant Director of Nursing, In-Service 
Director, Supervising Registered Nurses and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Service Employees International Union, Local 200-
D/1199. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 16, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Micha«l R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LACKAWANNA FREE UNION, 
_._._ -Petitioner,— —- -
-and- CASE NO. C-5069 
LACKAWANNA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CSEA, LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
LACKAWANNA CITY SCHOOL UNIT, ERIE 
EDUCATIONAL LOCAL 868, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the CSEA, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Lackawanna City School Unit, Erie Educational Local 868 has been designated and 
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selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
as agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for 
the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Included: All non-teaching employees of the Lackawanna City School District. 
Excluded: Supervisor and Assistant Supervisor of Buildings and Grounds, 
Clerk of the Board of Education and those people who are 
designated as Management and Confidential Employees under 
ARTICLE 14, Section 214 of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the CSEA, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Lackawanna City 
School Unit, Erie Educational Local 868. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: August 16, 2001 
Albany, New York si 
Mictearel R. Cuevas, Chairman 
^ 0 
" / 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
jDhn T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NSEA PER DIEM PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioners 
-and- CASE NO. C-5088 
NORTH SYRACUSE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the NSEA Per Diem Professional Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Included: All per diem teachers, per diem registered nurses, and per diem 
teaching assistants who have received a reasonable assurance of 
continuing employment as referenced in Civil Service Law, 
§201.7(d). 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the NSEA Per Diem Professional Association. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 16, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Micbael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/ llohn T. Mitchell, Member u 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAYLAND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5072 
VILLAGE OF WAYLAND, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Wayland Police Benevolent Association has 
been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Included: All full and part-time police officers. 
Excluded: Chief of Police. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collective^ 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 16, 2001 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/John T. Mitchell, Member 
